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Abstract: This paper focuses on theoretical issues of gender related to 
household decision making and examines its empirical validity on agricultural 
labour households in the context of a particular region of West Bengal. The 
study suggests that a woman‟s choice and rationality differ significantly from 
a man‟s. The loci of patriarchal power determines how, where, when and who 
make the choice.  Unlike unitary household model, collective household 
model, in which a household consists of individuals each of whom is 
characterized by particular preference, and among whom a collective decision 
making takes place, seems to be more general. Further, a large unexplained 
component of intra-occupational wage difference between man and woman is 
likely to indicate gender discrimination in the intra occupational labour market 
in which both men and women of a household participate. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 The area of gender studies has of late attracted the attention of scholars 
primarily as a result of the national and international resurgence of the 
women‟s movement. The analysis of household decision making undertaken 
here focuses on intra-household gender role based on some important aspects 
like „the issue of choice‟, „unit of analysis‟ on intra-household allocation of 
resources, concept of „market work‟, particularly, on intra-occupational wage 
differential between men and women in a labour market in which both men 
and women of a household participate, in the context of a particular region of 
West Bengal.  As regards household gender inequality, Sen (2001) argues that 
the reach of this inequality includes not only unequal relations within the 
family but also derivative inequalities in employment and recognition in the 
outside world.  But gender is not perceived to be a central concept in classical 
economics and neo-classical or among Marxist economics (Blau, 1989: 95). 
The central figure of all economic theory and activity is a “Homo 
Oeconomicus” flattened to such a degree that all class and gender differences 
are obliterated from analysis.  This class neutral, gender neutral (as well as 
caste, ethnic, race etc. neutral) model postulates a single universal rationality 
totally out of keeping with reality  (Kalpagam, 1986: WS-59: Dewan, 
1999:312-113).  Their conceptual basis is the impersonal market functioning 
in a capitalist situation, which supposedly automatically brings about an 
efficient allocation of resources with each individual seeking maximization of 
profits as a producer and of utility as a consumer.  The dominant paradigm in 
economics at present is Neo-classical; this is accepted as „Mainstream' 
economics. Some issues – the role of rationality as the unit of „choice‟, the 
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household model as the „unit of analysis‟, the concept of market work, market 
wage as the concept of „work‟ – central to the mainstream economic theory, 
have been questioned.  The contribution of modern neo-classical economics 
has been  subject to greater scrutiny and more rigorous analysis with women‟s 
economic roles within the family and the causes of gender inequality in 
economic outcomes (Blau, 1989: 96).  „Mainstream‟ economics assumes men 
and women to be abstractly equal, both making „rational‟, good choices 
regarding not only work but even marriage.  Mainstream macroeconomics is 
gender blind.  It is based on an incomplete understanding of how economics 
work.  This promotes the introduction of policies which disadvantage women, 
especially poor women (Elson, 2004: 6).  To whatever extent neo-classical 
economics has incorporated the concept of gender, it has tended to trivialize it.  
However, due to the vastness of the broader issue of the general relevance of 
neo-classical economics as a whole, this paper focuses on intra-household 
gender issues based on the role of rationality as the issue of choice, the unitary 
household model as the unit of analysis, the concept of wage differential 
between men and women as an explanation of human capital approach in 
„mainstream‟ economic theory and examines its empirical validity in the 
context of household decision making on agricultural labour household in a 
particular region of West Bengal in Indian perspective. 
II 
Theoretical Framework 
 The issue of „choice‟ is crucial to „mainstreatm‟ economics, as is the 
role of „rationality‟.  The standard neo-classical economist‟s functional kind of 
explanation is that because of their domestic responsibilities, women enter the 
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labour market with relatively poorer endowment of human capital – education, 
skill, experience – than man. Hence women receive poorer work experience.  
Besides, the fact that women are less well prepared for the job market is 
because men and women in a family rationally decide on who is to do what 
work.  In this, women choose to do domestic work.  As a result of that choice, 
women get less time to learn skills or receive education.  Thus the sexual 
division of labour is a matter of „rational choice‟ by the families as a part of 
the household work strategy (Becker, 1981). 
 These explanations of the issue of „choice‟ of mainstream economics 
are far from satisfactory on several grounds.  Some grounds seem to be 
relevant in the context of our empirical studies. 1st, as is done in the 
indifference curve analysis, posing a choice-decision between work and 
leisure simply does not either describe or integrate the alternatives for a 
women.  The women‟s „choice‟ and rationality differ significantly from a man 
for the existence of gender based division and segmentation of labour in 
particular, and patriarchy in general, because the society has historically 
assigned  women different roles both as a producer and as a consumer.  The 
allocation of authority and control within household structures by social norms 
and values produce unequal gender relation where men command authority 
and resources (Kabeer, 1995: 224-28).  According to Amartya Sen, women are 
less likely to secure favourable outcomes for themselves in household 
decision-making process; women feel that their long-term security lies in 
subordinating  their well being to that of male authority (cited in Pant, 2000: 
94).  The loci of patriarchal power, which are structured by social norms, 
values and practices within household, determines how, where, when and who 
 4 
make choice, 2nd, the sexual division of labour within household becomes 
both  an indicator of gender inequality and a major obstacle to the path of 
gender equality on other counts (Agarwal, 2004: 51).  Much of the cost of 
caring labour (a term coined by feminist economists) is borne by women.  For 
example, most women at considerable economic cost to themselves provide 
caring labour like unequal sharing of domestic work, childcare, and care of 
elderly. A growing body of studies, so far mostly in the west, reveals that 
women face a significant reduction in average lifetime earnings as a result of 
their childcare responsibilities ( Waldfogel, 1997 ,cited in  Agarwal, 2004: 
51).  This would leave women in the home with a weaker bargaining position.  
Similarly, domestic work is perceived as being less valuable than work, which 
brings monetary income with the result that this would also reduce women‟s 
bargaining power within the family.  Moreover, women‟s primary 
responsibilities for childcare restrict their participation in collective or political 
activity (Ibid: 51-2).  3rd, the analysis of consumer‟s choice is irrelevant to 
women; this is because the income women spend accrues mainly because of 
their patriarchal power relation or total dependence on male earnings and the 
lack of control over their own earnings (Bell, 1977).  Moreover, the better 
economic position of women in some cases suppresses the „rational choice‟ of 
women from their strong ideology of portraying these women mainly as 
nurturers of the family, and so any change in the family based image of 
women is avoided (Banerjee, 1999, Mehta, 1976).  4th, Labour market studies 
anywhere show that the differential in male and female work experiences 
comes about not so much through men getting better conditions than women 
in identical jobs.  It comes about through women being allotted separate jobs, 
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which are then treated as inferior (Banerjee, 1999).  Further, it has been shown 
that whether an occupation is defined as skilled or otherwise is largely a 
matter of decisions being influenced by more powerful groups, usually male 
workers (Cockburn, 1983).  5th the economic role of producer and consumer 
combined for a women is unpaid labour at home.  Society assigns her the role 
of wife and mother and in doing so decrees the feminine productive function 
as that of providing services to the household itself.  As consumer, women 
acts as purchasing agent for the family and in effect buys the raw materials 
that she uses in household production.  Neither as producer nor as consumer 
does she have the freedom of „choice‟ allotted to a man (Bell, 1977).  6th, the 
uniform notion of rationality of neo-classical paradigm is questionable, since 
individuals are differently placed.  Individuals in household on the verge of 
subsistence find that their work and consumption do not maximize their utility 
but maximize the survival chances of the household as a whole (Kalpagam, 
1986:WS59). 
 Another issue central to the „mainstream‟ economic theory is the „unit 
of analysis‟, taken generally as the firm in the context of the working of the 
market in a capitalist system.  „The household model‟ is a reformulation of the 
standard neo-classical consumer demand theory and is based on the seminal 
work of Becker (1965) who introduced a unit set of models, referred to here as 
unitary models, wherein the household welfare function is considered to be 
identical to that of  the benevolent dictator who heads the household and 
ensures that welfare resources are optimally allocated between household 
members (Becker 1981: 192).  More specifically, Beckerian model, as in the 
case of neo-classical consumer theory, assumes a common utility function for 
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all members of the household; there is no scope for conflict of interests within 
the family.  Further, the income or resources of all members of the family are 
assumed to be pooled and allocated based on the common preference function 
and the underlying assumption is that the household is a „homogeneous unit‟.  
As many of the commodities produced at home are substituted for purchased 
goods, what is maximized is a common utility function in which the household 
and not the individual is the unit of inquiry.  Becker (1981) assumes that the 
„altruistic‟ head of the family acts in the joint interest of all, and everybody 
else in the family has exactly the same rational perception of the family‟s joint 
interest, which they all want to maximize in a rational and systematic way 
(cited in Sen, 1995:260). 
 The neo-classical explanation of unit of analysis is also subjected to 
criticism. Sen (1995) is of the view that Beckerian model avoids the problem 
of conflict in cooperative conflicts by making everyone pursue the same 
objectives with the result that they have no disharmony of interest, or of 
objectives.  With an example he argues that if women (or girls) die in much 
larger numbers than men (or boys) for differential medical attention and health 
care, then this unitary model requires that such differentials are what every 
member of the family (including the relatively more-stricken women) 
rationally promotes and their consequences are what they jointly seek (Ibid, 
261).  Different family members are observed to have partly divergent interest 
and the existence of conflicts is fully acknowledged in game theoretic 
discussions of the „bargaining problem‟ inside the family (Manser and Brown, 
1980, cited in Sen, 1995:261).   
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 Household Bargaining Model acts as a challenge to Gary Becker‟s 
unitary household model in that household bargaining models have a strong 
potential for formalism and empirical testing, and they can have strong 
efficiency and equity effects inducing policy shifts (say, in resource transfers) 
in a more gender equal direction (Agarwal, 2004: 4).  According to Agarwal 
(2004), the application of bargaining theory to explain gender-differentiated 
intra-household outcomes have provided the most effective challenge to the 
standard assumptions of neoclassical economics in theoretical as well as 
empirical terms (Ibid: 4-5). A framework based on Nash – bargaining co-
operative game theoretic framework
1
 generates a demand system that is more 
general.  (Duraisamy and Duraisamy 2001).  The bargaining models explicitly 
address the question of how individual preferences lend to collective choice.  
To find a solution of a bargaining problem, two approaches-co-operative and 
non co-operative-have been used.  For the presence of public goods within the 
family and companionship, loving and caring etc., the family bargaining 
problem can be viewed as a two-person, non-zero sum game.  Since the family 
decision involves to some extent a degree of co-operation, a co-operative 
game approach is more appealing and is widely used.  A number of 
researchers, among others, have applied the bargaining approach in empirical 
studies of household decisions in the context of labour supply of men and 
women (Schultz, 1990), resource allocation within the household to child 
survival (Thomas, 1990), child health (Bolin and Bjorn, 2001), intra-family 
allocation of consumption. The bargaining approach seems to be more 
appropriate in the case of intra-family allocation of resources among boys and 
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girls for schooling, health, food distribution etc. (Duarisamy and Duraisamy, 
2001). 
 Although within the household model Mincer (1962) pointed out the 
importance, especially for women, of the three-way decision among market-
work, non-market work and leisure, Becker (1981) eliminated the distinction 
between non-market work and leisure.  Some recent approaches, termed as 
collective models, treat the household as a collection of individuals who have 
„heterogeneous preferences‟.  It seems to be relevant to mention that within 
the collective models, which treat the household as a collection of individuals 
who have heterogeneous preferences, the household behaviour has been 
analysed in two frameworks – cooperative (some contracts are binding and 
enforceable) and non-cooperative.  Out of two sub-classes of cooperative 
collective models, Bargaining and Pareto efficient Bargaining models of 
marriage treat marriage as a cooperative game: spouses with conflicting 
interests or preferences are assumed to resolve their differences in a manner 
prescribed by the Nash or some other explicit bargaining models in which total 
family resources and the resources controlled by each spouse play a significant 
role (Manser and Brown, 1980 and McElory and Horney, 1981, cited in 
Lundberg and Pollak, 1993:993).  Individual‟s control of resources depends on 
threat point and on the feasible consumption set. The non-cooperative models 
assume that individuals cannot enter into binding and enforceable contracts 
with each other within household; within an existing marriage a non-
cooperative equilibrium corresponds to a utility maximizing strategy in which 
each spouse takes the other spouse‟s strategy as given (Wooley 1993; 
Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Kanbur and Haddah, 1991).  Under some 
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circumstances the non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage more 
accurately represents the outcome of marital non-cooperation than does the 
costly and time-consuming alternative of divorce (Lundberg and Pollak, 
1993). 
 
 What is needed, according to Sen, (1995) is a combination, which 
acknowledges possibility of real conflicts of interests (unlike in Becker‟s 
framework) coexisting with a socially conditioned perception of harmony 
(unlike in standard game theoretic model).  In making people with divergent 
interests feel united around shared perception of common objectives, implicit 
theories of justice and traditional understandings of what is „natural‟ and 
„proper‟ can play a major part (Sen, 1995: 261). 
 The issue of the concept of “work” is also crucial to „mainstreatm‟ 
economics as work in economics is generally equated with „market‟ work or 
„paid‟ work, that is, labour power, which has a exchange value.  Neo-classical 
economic theory depends mainly on models of perfect competition where 
wages are equal to value of the workers‟ marginal product.  Neo-classical 
economic theory also states that as wage increases, supply of labour will also 
increase.  Moreover, the wage differential between men and women under 
neo-classical theories can be explained by „human capital‟ approach.  This 
competitive model explains wage and productivity differentials through 
differences in the quality of labour between men and women. „Human Capital‟ 
is acquired by workers who invest in themselves through education, on the job 
training, experience etc.  The cost of acquiring the skill is compared with the 
expected return on the investment made in terms of higher wages.  This theory 
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thus concludes that as men have invested more in themselves, they have more 
human capital than women, and so receive higher wages.  This approach 
assumes „freedom of choice‟ without taking into account the restrictions 
imposed by society on both a woman‟s freedom and her „choice‟. According 
to Becker (1981), women‟s role in reproduction makes it rational for women 
to specialize more in family skill and men more in labour market skills and 
parents make a rational choice for their children by preparing them for 
different careers.  Women‟s ability for the labour market increases when 
women‟s reproductive role is reduced due to the decline of birth rates.  
However in countries with low fertility, women begin to invest more in the 
labour market skills than in the case in countries with continued high fertility.  
Thus sex-related differences and types of human investment and availability 
provide the explanation for the difference in wages, types of work and 
promotion.    
 The issue of „concept of work‟ of mainstream economics is far from 
satisfactory for several grounds.  First, non-market activities have remained, 
in the main, out of the scope of neo-classical economics.  In underdeveloped, 
semi-feudal economies the primary production unit is the household where 
non-commodity characteristics are retained alongside commodity production. 
Thus in underdeveloped subsistence economy where majority of women work 
in the non-market sector, according to the neo-classical explanation they are 
classified as non-worker, non-producers and hence are invisible in the data.  
This leads to an underestimation of the labour force as well as to the 
devaluation and non-recognition of women‟s economic contribution.  2nd, as 
mentioned earlier, various studies on explanations of wage differentials 
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suggest that a significant percentage of total wage gap between men and 
women  remain unexplained.  Even neo-classical theories are not able to 
explain wage differential fully even within a capitalist system.  (Bergmann, 
1986).  3rd, it is also said that women are distinct separate section of the 
employed; they have been hired for their so-called special qualities.  And yet 
they are being paid lower wages than man even when demand for this 
segregated section of the labour forces are increasing faster than for male 
labour.  Even if they are fully absorbed in the work force, their wages have 
remained inferior to those of man (Banerjee 1999).  4th, the main instrument 
for maintenance of patriarchy is occupational segregation which reinforces the 
traditional division of labour resulting in lower wages for women which in 
turn maintains their economic dependence on man.  Simultaneously, the 
domestic division of labour reinforces occupational segregation by weakening 
women‟s status in the labour market.  The „specialization‟ Principle of 
Beckerian Model has been questioned on different grounds.  Such a division 
of labour may not be as advantageous for women as  for men.  When there are 
conflict of interests or even pronounced differences in tastes between the 
husband and the wife, the concept of family utility function itself becomes less 
meaningful (Blau, 1989:99).  Moreover, women‟s comparative advantage for 
household production may stem not only from the impact of biology and 
gender differences in upbringing and the tastes, but also from the effect of 
labour market discrimination in lowering women‟s earnings relative to men‟s. 
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III 
Survey Design and Methodology 
 Our survey was carried out with data pertaining to 150 households 
from 4 villages of Habra Block-I in the district of North 24 Parganas in West 
Bengal.  In selecting the villages, a list of different villages located in the 
Block was first obtained from the Agricultural Development Office and then 2 
villages were selected having the higher incidence of irrigational and HYV 
facilities
2
 and the rest of the villages were selected having no irrigational 
facilities except rain-water.  For the selection of households in the second 
stage, the lists of households were prepared separately for owner-cultivators, 
tenant cultivators and agricultural labourers from the Gram Panchayet Records 
of each village.  Detailed lists of each category available from each gram 
Panchayet Records were then used to draw the sample of households for our 
study following the method of simple random sampling without replacement.  
Our sample covered 50 owner-cultivating households, 50 tenant cultivating 
households and 50 agricultural labour households consisting of 50 per cent in 
each type of household from each type of villages (Villages having irrigational 
and HYV facilities, and without irrigational facilities). We surveyed the 
villages throughout the year 1995-96. 
 This exercise is based on 50 sample agricultural labour households 
because, among others, of the availability of data on individual source of 
income of male and female of each household.  More importantly, like male 
working members, female working members of those households were 
agricultural labour and their earnings (in Rs.) would usually come from wage-
labour.  So, individual-specific source of income of agricultural labour 
 13 
households was hardly difficult to calculate.  On the other hand, owner 
cultivating and tenant cultivating household‟s income were mainly based on 
their own-farm income.  The female members of those households were also 
engaged in household farm and non-farm works.  Consequently, the individual 
specific source of income of male and female members of owner and tenant 
cultivating households were unexplored in this survey.   
 
 Regarding the first issue – „the issue of choice‟-crucial to „mainstream‟ 
economics, simple proportions, averages etc. are used to assess empirically the 
extent of women workers‟ active involvement in decision-making relating to 
general domestic issues and the extent of male members‟ active involvement 
in household workload-sharing. 
 Turning to the second issue of „mainstream‟ economics, „the household 
model‟ as the „unit of analysis‟ assumes common utility function for all 
members of the households; the demand system contains a common family 
household income effect.  In contrast, collective household model takes into 
account individual-specific income effect in the demand function.  We 
estimate income effects of husband and wife for all children on Health 
expenditure and Educational expenditure separately. 
 Hi = 1 + 1 Yi + ei ……………... (1) 
 Ei = 2 + 2 Yi + ei ………………(2) 
 H and E represent Health expenditure and Educational expenditure for 
all children respectively.  Y is the spouse-specific income and i, households.  
E is the random-error term.   
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 We also estimate spouse-specific labour force participation on spouse–
specific income.  The labour force participation was estimated using 
maximum likelihood probit model. 
 To understand the model, let us assume that there exists a theoretical 
continuous index Ii (unobservable utility index) that is determined by an 
explanatory model Y. 
 
 Thus we may write the index Ii as  
 Ii =  +   Yi   
 Where Yi is the spouse-specific income of i
th
 household.  The 
unobservable index (Ii) is related to the actual decision in the following: 
 Z = 1, If husband (wife) participate in the labour force and Z = 0, if he 
(she) does not.  Hence it is reasonable to assume that there is a critical or 
threshold level of the index, Ii*, such that if Ii exceeds Ii* the husband (wife) 
participates in the labour force, otherwise she will not.   
 Ii* is assumed to be normally distributed random variable.  Given the 
assumption of normality, the probability Ii
*
 is less than or equal to Ii can be 
computed from the standardized normal CDF as  
Pi = Prob (Z = I/Y) = Prob (Ii*  Ii)=F(Ii)   
)3..(..................
2
1
2
1 2/2/ 2
21
2
dtedte t
yIi
t
i
 
 Where t is a standardized normal variable, i.e. t~N(0,1) 
 To obtain information on Ii, the utility index, as well as 1 and 2, we 
take the inverse of (3) to obtain 
Ii = F
-1
(Pi) = 1 + 2 Yi   
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 Since the normal equivalent deviate (n, e, d) or Ii will be negative 
whenever Pi<0.5, in practice, the number 5 is added to n.e.d and the result is 
called a probit. 
As regards the issue of concept of „work‟ of neo-classical economics 
for a given occupation, we may estimate the individual monthly earnings in 
terms of worker‟s characteristics-education, experience, marital status 
(married/unmarried)- for male and female separately.  In doing so, the 
coefficients of each characteristic are determined by individual equation.  The 
variable „experience‟ is the „potential experience‟ and is defined as age minus 
years of schooling and 6. 
 Extending the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach, Brown et al. 
(1980) developed an approach, which decomposes the total wage differential 
between men and women into components related to intra-occupation wage 
differences and inter-occupational differences.  This approach has often been 
used to study the wage effect of occupational segregation (e.g. Miller, 1987; 
Gabril and Schmitz, 1989, Moll, 1992; Terrell, 1992; Kidd and Shannon, 
1994; Meng and Miller, 1995; Sung et. al. 2001). 
 Let the wage of individual i in occupation j be expressed as  
 Wij = j + Xij j + Uj, J=1,2……j………….(4) 
Where X represent the workers characteristics (education, marital 
status, experience).  W is the money wage,  and  are parameters to be 
estimated.  U is a random error term. 
           As our exercise is based on data relating to 50 agricultural labour 
households which are entirely dependent on the occupation of wage-earning as 
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agricultural labour, the inter-occupational components is absent.  Hence 
equation (4) may be expressed as  
            Wi =  + Xi +Ei  ……………….(5) 
Brown et al. (1980) show that the gender wage differential can be 
decomposed as follows. 
             
f
j
m
j
m
j
f
j
m
j
m
j
f
j
fm
PPWXXpWW  
                                        
    A                             B 
 
                                                                C 
                                    ………………(6) 
D 
Where a bar over a variable denotes the mean value, superscripts m 
and f refer to males and females respectively, the term p
f
j(p
m
j) is the observed 
proportion of females (males) in occupation j, and the term 
f
jP  represents the 
hypothetical proportion of women in the sample who would be in occupation j 
if women faced the same occupational structure as men.  The summation is 
over j from 1 to j.   
 The above decomposition of the gender wage differential can 
be conveniently illustrated as the sum of four terms, A, B, C and D as 
follows:- 
 Intra-occupation  (explained): A 
f
j
m
j
f
j
f
j
f
j
m
j
f
j XPP
f
j
f
j
m
j PPW
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 Inter-occupation  (explained): B 
 Intra-occupation  (unexplained): C 
 Inter-occupation  (unexplained): D 
 
The terms that are explained (A and B) capture the wage differential 
due to differences in characteristics between men and women, while those that 
are unexplained (C and D) reflect the wage differential due to differences in 
estimated coefficients (i.e. differential treatment in the labour market) and may 
be a result of discrimination. 
 Terms A and C are similar to the explained and unexplained terms in a 
conventional Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach, except that the 
occupation distribution is now accounted for explicitly.  Our analysis relating 
to the gender wage differential is also based on A and C components of Brown 
et al. (1980) approach following conventional Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
model. 
IV 
Empirical Analysis 
 With a view to understanding the existing pattern of power in a 
household it is essential to assess the influence of different members in 
making household decisions.  Two broad areas of decision-making were 
selected, namely, general domestic issues (such as those relating to children, 
domestic expenditure, medical care, festivals, gifts/donations and marriage) 
and household asset management issues. 
 It is usually believed that female members in a household would 
dominate in household decision-making.  But the findings of our survey show 
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that the dominant role in both the decision-making areas was occupied by 
male members (Table-1).  In more than half of the sample labour households 
(54.00 percent) women did not participate in household decision-making.  
Non-participation in the decision-making of household asset management 
issue worked out to about four-fifths of the households (78.00).  Turning to the 
joint participations, high level of joint participation was dominant (28 percent 
of households) in relation to others (low and medium) in general domestic 
issues.  An analysis of women workers‟ active involvement in decision-
making relating to general domestic issues indicates that since they contribute 
their earnings to household subsistence and are responsible for household 
maintenance, they have some influence only in the „nitty-gritty‟ decisions of 
the household.  Their negligible participation in decisions relating to 
household asset management points to the general gender bias against women 
who are considered unable to take any crucial decisions which are related 
directly or indirectly to the „market‟.  Obviously, our findings seem to 
contradict the issue of „choice‟, crucial to neo-classical economics, as in the 
role of rationality suggesting that the loci of patriarchal power determines who 
makes the choice.  Our empirical observations are almost in conformity with 
Pant (2000) who observes that men, who took almost all crucial decisions 
relating to household asset management, are associated with public domain 
and women who are capable of making only general household related 
decisions are associated with the private domain, that is the household.  Her 
study points to gender bias against women within the society whereby women 
are denied power and autonomy. Narasimhan (1999) observed that 
participation in decision-making in the control villages was negligible.  
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Traditionally, women have relied on man of the household for decisions, even 
those affecting their own lives.  She also found that joint decision making 
(among men and women) rose from 21 per cent in the control villages to 87 
per cent in villages which had been exposed to awareness campaigns, 
testifying to a considerable improvement in women‟s participation in decision-
making and showing an impressive curtailment in male monopoly of assets in 
AWARE (Action for Welfare and Awakening in Rural Environment) villages. 
 The intra-household power structure that restricts the „freedom of 
choice‟ of women might also emerge from the extent of household workload 
sharing between men and women.  Three broad areas were selected to measure 
overall household division of labour – Housework, Childcare and Marketing.  
Housework includes the task related to sustenance of the household, such as 
fetching water, cooking, cleaning, washing and laundering. Childcare 
includes child rearing, feeding, bathing and teaching.  Marketing includes 
task related to the purchase of household provisions from the market.  It is 
quite common that main responsibility of household and childcare falls on 
women members; male members and elderly women are usually involved in 
purchasing daily provisions (Pant, 2000).  Results of our study relating to 
household duties- housework, childcare and marketing-also support this 
traditional phenomena (Table 2).  Moreover, in almost all cases marketing 
duties (shopping) were executed by female members as also household 
cooking and childcare.  This study, thus, suggests that patriarchal power 
structure determines unequal division of labour within household duties that 
restricts the „freedom of choice‟ of women.  Our empirical observation seems 
to support the findings of Nararasimhan (1999) who observed that 
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participation in housework by men was very poor in the control villages.  But 
a perceptible change in the extent of work sharing by men was noticed within 
5(five) years in AWARE villages constituting an improvement in the status of 
women within the family. As the impact of her study observed in the control 
villages, resources and services were mainly male dominated, whereas 
AWARE villages showed a curtailment of male monopoly and shift towards 
joint direction, joint ownership and control, joint sharing of duties and an 
improvement in the status of women in the family. It leads to a considerable 
improvement of the restrictions imposed by society on both a women‟s 
„freedom‟ and her „choice‟.  But no perceptible change of patriarchal power 
structure that restricts the „choice‟ of women‟s decision-making or work 
sharing by men was noticed in our study during a time very close to 21st 
century. 
 Turning to the second issue of mainstream economic theory – the „unit 
of analysis‟, unlike unitary household model which assumes a common utility 
function for all members of the household and pooling of resources among 
family members, Cooperative household models share a premise that a 
household consists of individuals, each of whom is, characterized by particular 
preference and among whom a collective decision making process takes place. 
The latter model takes into account individual specific income effects in the 
demand functions.  It seems to be more appropriate in the case of intra-family 
allocation of resources among boys and girls for schooling, health, food 
distribution etc. (Duraisamy and Duraisamy, 2001).  In our study, the 
estimated income effect of father and mother on educational expenditure and 
health expenditure is positive and statistically significant (Table 3).  It also 
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suggests that husband‟s income effect is different from wife‟s. Here a related 
issue is: do men fritter away this additional earning on their own expenditure 
like alcohol etc. so that the income of mother on educational expenditure and 
health expenditure given in Table 3 is positive and significant?  As our study 
relates to cross sectional data, the change of the proportion of father‟s outlay 
on goods like alcohol etc. can not be obtained.  Nevertheless, the cross-
sectional study shows that fathers‟ outlay on goods like alcohol, cigarette etc. 
possess a very negligible portion of their (fathers‟) total expenditure (about 
0.96 per cent of total expenditure).  However Table 3 might suggest that an 
increase in individual-specific income would improve education and health 
care measures for all children. 
 Equation of labour force participation (spouse – specific), calculated 
on the basis of working days using maximum likelihood probit model, shows 
that income effects for both wife and husband are of expected (negative) sign 
and statistically significant (Table 4).  Although this study does not lend 
support for Household Bargaining Approach, unlike common preference 
function for all members of the family, individual control of resources and the 
question of how individual preferences lead to collective choice seem to be 
more appropriate. 
 We may now attempt to examine the empirical validity of neo-classical 
concept of work, generally equated with „market‟ work or „paid‟ work which 
supports that as women have lower incentives to invest in market-oriented 
formal education and on-the-job training than men, the result of smaller 
human capital investment by women will lower their earnings relative to those 
of men.  Following equation (4) the estimated values of workers 
 22 
characteristics (intra-occupational) reveals that for each individual workers 
characteristics, both men and women are equally significant (Table 5).  It is 
important to mention that instead of considering single equation separately for 
male wages and female wages on all workers‟ characteristics – education, 
marital status and experience, we regress male or female wages on each 
characteristic separately because the influence on male and female wages of  
individual characteristic seem to be more meaningful (Sung et al, 2001). The 
results of the decomposition model based on intra-occupational wage 
differential between men and women (equation 6) suggest that the explained 
wage differences due to education, marital status and experience are 
negligible
3
 (Table 6).  The explained gender wage differential possesses 
negative sign indicating that explained wage differential for men is not so 
important as women.  Table 6 also shows that the intra-occupational gender 
wage differential is due to unexplained component of decomposition model. It 
seems to indicate high gender discrimination in the intra-occupation labour 
market. However, in order to judge the relative importance of individual 
characteristics, we regress male or female wage on all the characteristics 
combining with three (beta) coefficients and one (alpha) coefficient for male 
or female wage equations respectively (Table 7). It shows that the estimated t 
values of all the workers‟ characteristics along with their constant terms are 
significant in both the equations although the level of significance differs in 
both the equations. It might suggest that the influence of male or female wage 
of all the combined workers‟ characteristics is significant. The decomposition 
model based on male and female wages on combined workers‟ characteristics 
is portrayed in Table 8. The results given in Table 8 are in conformity with 
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that of Table 6. However, it may be stressed that the unexplained part of the 
gender gap may be partly due to factors other than discrimination.  Part of the 
unexplained gap may be due to variables that are not included in the model.  
For instance, intensity of effort is a very important variable explaining 
earnings, but this variable is absent from almost all data set because it is very 
difficult to observe and measure
4
.  Thus if it is assumed that the intensity of 
work effort accounts for a significant part of the unexplained gap of this intra-
occupational gender wage differential, wage differential due to gender 
discrimination cannot be avoided. 
 It should be noted that despite ranking first out of a total of 36 Asian 
countries by the Index of Women‟s Advancement (IWA): Asia and the 
Pacific, Hong Kong experiences gender discrimination in her labour market 
mostly due to the intra-occupational component of gender wage differential 
(Sung et al, 2001).  It is also found that most of the intra-occupation wage gap 
is unexplained and has increased over the year; but the unexplained earnings 
differential due to occupational differences (inter-occupation) favored females 
in all years. 
 Regarding the issue of non-market activities, indeed, the majority of 
women in a country like India still work in the non-market sector and thus 
they are classified as non-worker and non-producer according to neo-classical 
concept of „work‟.  Table 2 also suggests that the household workload duties 
almost executed by women are usually non-market activities, which have also 
remained outside the scope of neo-classical economics. 
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V 
Conclusion 
 „Mainstream‟ economics apparently the most „scientific‟ of all social 
sciences, does not have much to offer either conceptually or methodologically 
in terms of gender.  To whatever extent neo-classical economics has 
incorporated the concept of gender, it has tended to trivialize it.  What neo-
classical economics ignores is that patriarchy is fully integrated with 
production relations and productive forces.  Thus a beaconing clue arising 
from our empirical findings based on the evidence in a particular region of 
West Bengal is that the role of rationality as the issue of „choice‟, the 
household model as the „unit of the analysis‟, the concept of „market‟ work, 
„market‟ wages as the „concept of work‟ are fully integrated with patriarchal 
production relations and productive forces.  The results of our analysis might 
suggest that the choice of decision making relating to „household domestic 
affairs‟ and „household asset management issues‟, and „workload sharing‟ in 
different household duties which are usually non-marketable, women are 
denied power and autonomy; rather patriarchal power, social and traditional 
norms in subordinating women‟s well-being to that of male authority 
determine women‟s choice which reflects unequal division of labour within 
household that restricts the freedom of choice of women.  The reach of this 
inequality includes not only unequal relations within the family, but also 
derivative inequalities in employment and recognition in the outside world 
(Sen, 2001).  Relating to the second issue, unlike the household utility 
function as the unit of analysis usually based on common utility preference 
and pooling of resources among family members, the question of how 
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individual preferences lead to collective choice, seems to be more appropriate.  
It has been shown that spouse-specific income effect has significant influence 
in intra-family allocation of resources relating to educational expenses, health 
expenditures of the children and specific labour force participation implying 
individual control of resources seems to be more promising.  Furthermore, 
neo-classical concept of work, generally equated with „market‟ work or „paid‟ 
work, is unable to explain intra-occupational wage difference between men 
and women.  Our findings suggest that the intra-occupational wage difference 
is due to unexplained component of decomposition model.  It indicates, likely, 
a significant gender discrimination in intra-occupational labour market. 
 It would be simplistic to say that mere access to and control over 
resources would guarantee autonomy and „freedom of choice‟ to women.  
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that improvements in status and access 
to resources have not enabled women to become the equals of men.  What is 
necessary is not just „freedom of action‟ but also „freedom of thoughts‟ in 
determining their bargaining power.  The perception of self-worth of women 
members within the household is an important component in determining their 
bargaining power.  Women who generally have a low sense of worth have 
weaker bargaining and fallback positions (Young 1992).  Greater involvement 
of empowerment strategy like education, participation in community affairs, 
decision-making ability and autonomy, access to government functionaries, 
overcoming fear of authority etc. are necessary for generating the perception 
of high sense of self-worth of women members within and outside the 
household.  An enhancement of women‟s active agency is important in 
combating inequality of every kind.  Added to it, the findings that the intra-
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occupational gender wage differential is unexplained may call for, as in Brown 
et al (1980) and Miller (1987), a more adequate anti-discrimination legislation 
aimed at promoting equal pay for equal work within same occupation. 
Notes 
1. Under the Co-operative approach, Nash Bargaining Solution is one 
approach, which satisfies 5 desirable properties – strong individual 
rationality, Pareto optimality, symmetry, independence of irrelevant 
alternative and invariance.  Nash demand functions explicitly takes 
into account individual specific income effects in the demand 
functions.  It is possible to test whether the husband‟s income effect is 
different from wife‟s income effect or they are equal by empirically 
estimating the demand functions using appropriate econometric 
methodology. 
 
2. 82 per cent and above of the net cultivable area in each village is 
irrigated as well as under HYV crop cultivation. 
3. Sung et al (2001) took two more extra explanatory variables – widow, 
china (country) – in the equation.  In our sample we had only two 
agricultural labourers who were widow.  Further, as all the sample 
households are taken from 4 villages within a particular Block in West 
Bengal ranging between 10 to 15 kilometers, the wage differential due 
to place does not become relevant here.  So the wage equation has 
taken in linear form instead of semi -log model. 
4. Becker (1985) argues that married women do most of the household 
chores and thus have less energy available for the market than do most 
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husbands.  When women spend less energy per hour of work, they earn 
less.  Moreover, their household responsibilities induce occupational 
segregation because women seek occupations and jobs that are less 
effort-intensive and otherwise are more compatible with the demands 
of their home responsibilities. 
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Table 1: Levels of Participation in Household Decision-Making 
 
(in Percentages) 
 
Levels of 
Participation 
General Domestic 
Issues 
Household Asset 
Management issues 
Non-Participation 54.00 (27) 78.00 (39) 
Joint Participation 46.00 (23) 22.00 (11) 
Low 6.00 (3)              12.00 (6) 
Medium             12.00 (6)  6.00 (3) 
High 28.00 (14)                4.00 (2) 
     
Figure in brackets represent number of household 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Women saying „Yes‟ to Work-Sharing by Men: 
 
Household Duties Percentage of Total Household 
Cooking 8 
Fuel-wood Collection 6 
Getting Water 12 
Shopping 10 
Looking after children 8 
Caring for sick child 16 
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Table 3: Spouse – Specific Income effect on Educational Expenditure & Health 
Expenditure for All Children 
 
Equation 
Husband’s (Father’s) 
income effect 
Wife’s (Mother’s) 
income effect 
Health 
0.1154* 
(45.27) 
0.1764* 
(54.62) 
Education 
0.15* 
(68.11) 
0.23* 
(65.88) 
Adj.R
2
 0.77 0.89 
 
Note: (1) The dependent variable is the health expenditure or educational 
expenditure for all children and the explanatory variable is the 
spouse – specific income. 
 
(2) Figures in Parentheses represent t values. 
*Signification at 1 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Spouse-Specific Income Effect on Labour Force Participation: 
 
Income Effect 
Equation 
Labour Force Participation 
Adj.R
2 
Value 
Husband 
-8.2555* 
(-7.916) 
0.55 
Wife 
-1.764* 
(-0.326) 
0.47 
 
1) The dependent variable is binary and gender (Male/Female) specific.  The 
independent variable is spouse-specific income. 
 
2) Figures in Parenthesis represent t values. 
*Significant at 1 percent level. 
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Table 5: Estimated Values of Male/Female Wage (in Rs.) on Individual 
(Male/Female) Workers‟ Characteristics (Intra-Occupational) 
 
Works 
Characteristics  
Estimated Values 
Constant Slope 
Adj.R
2 
 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Education 
14.11 
(4.25) 
5.64 
(3.25) 
38.68 
(4.36) 
24.05 
(3.54) 
0.93 0.91 
Marital Status 
12.74 
(3.82) 
5.62 
(2.98) 
39.12 
(3.92) 
25.28 
(3.32) 
0.94 0.92 
Experience 
22.17 
(4.79) 
14.18 
(4.12) 
38.69 
(3.39) 
27.55 
(4.10) 
0.92 0.95 
 
Figures in brackets represent t values.  All t values are significant at 1 percent 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Decomposition of Earnings-differential (Intra-Occupational): 
 
Wage Differential Value % 
Total wage-differential 20.0194 100 
Explained (A) - 0.6860 - 3.427 
Unexplained (C) 20.7054 103.427 
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Table 7: Estimated Values of Male/Female Wage (in Rs.) on Combined 
(Male/Female) Workers‟ Characteristics (Intra-Occupational) 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Estimated Values 
Adj.R
2
 
Constant 
Slope 
Education Marital Status Experience 
Male 
wage(Rs.)  
11.02 
(3.21) 
 
19.56 
(2.30)** 
8.28 
(3.15)* 
15.63 
(2.96)* 
0.88 
Female 
wage(Rs.) 
7.05 
(3.84) 
26.04 
(3.93)* 
6.36 
(2.51)** 
21.25 
(3.15)* 
0.82 
 
Figures in brackets represent t values. * Significant at 1 per cent level. 
** Significant at 5 per cent level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Decomposition of Earnings-differential (Intra-Occupational) 
 
Wage Differential Value % 
Total wage-differential 17.401 100 
Explained (A) 2.953 5.874 
Unexplained (C) 14.448 94.126 
 
